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IN THE 
Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia 
AT RICIIMOND. 
Record No. 1736 
C. B. HARRIS AND PEARL 1\L HARRIS, Plaintiffs in 
Error, 
versns 
E. ,T. LIPSON AND CHEV ALlER 1\tiORGAN, Defendants 
in Error. 
PETITION FOR vVRIT OF ERROR. 
To the IIO'Iwrable J·udges of the Sup1·e'lne Court of Appeals 
of Virginia: 
Your undersig·ned petitioners, C. B. Harris and Pearl M. 
Harris, respectfully represent unto Your I-Ionors that they 
are agg-rieved oy a final judgment of the La'v and Equity 
Court, Part II, of the City of Richmond, in an action at law 
wherein your petitioners were the plaintiffs and E. J. Lipson 
and Chevalier ~forgan the defendants. · 
In said action the plaintiffs claimed damages in the sum 
of fourteen hundred dollars ($1,400.00) against the defend:. 
ants on account of damages sustained by the plaintiffs by 
reason of the breach of an attachment bond, which bond was 
executed by the defendant E. J. Lipson as principal and by 
the ·defendant Chevalier ~forgan as surety. Upon the trial 
of the case there was a verdict for your petitioners, the plain=-
tiffs, against the defendants in the slim of seventy-thr·eo 
($.7~) cents: Judgment was entered ·on the verdict, and it is 
2 Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia. 
from this judgment that the plaintiffs prosecute this ap· 
peal. 
A. transcript of the record, duly certified, accompanies this 
petition and is made part hereof. Your petitioners adopt this 
petition as their original brief and delivered a copy thereof in 
person to l\{r. Allen G. Collins, Counsel for defendants on 
the 23rd day of September, 1935. 
STATE~IEN'r OF THE CASE. 
The plaintiffs in the trial court are the plaintiffs in this · 
court. Some tin1e in 1932 the plaintiffs were endorsers on 
certain second· n1ortgage notes, held by the defendant, E. J. 
Lipson. The said E. ~J. Lipson started an attachment suit in 
the Law and Equity Court, Part II, of the City of Richmond, 
against the plaintiffs, C. B. !farris and Pearl J\II. I-Iarris on 
these notes. The said E. J. Lipson caused the attachment 
to be issued against the personal estate and real estate of the 
defendants in the attachment and specifically against a cer-
tain parcel of real estate, situated in the City of Richmond, 
Virginia, known as No. 101 and No. 101 lj2 South Harrison 
S.treet, which was owned by the plaintiffs, C. B. Harr·is and 
Pearl 1\L :Harris (defendants in the attachment). In his pe-
tition for the attaclnnent, the said E. J. Lipson alleged that 
C. B. Harris and Pearl ~I. Harris ·had assig11ed or disposed 
of or were about to assign or dispose of their estate or son1e 
part thereof with intent to hinder, delay, or defraud their 
creditors. The attaclunent WH-R issued by the clerk of the 
court, delivered into the hands of the she1:iff, and the Hheriff 
served the attaclnnent on the person in possession of tl1e real 
estate. The sheriff Inacle an endorsement on the attachment, 
but failed to make the detailed endorsement required by sec-
tion 6390 of the Code of Virginia, ·with respect to th·~ levy 
of attachments on real estate. The sheriff did, however, 
serve the attachment on the real estate agents who were 
holding certain rents due to your petitioners. The levy on 
these rents was made in strict conformity to Section 6390 of 
the Code of Virginia. The plaintiffs offered to prove at 
the trial that the said E. J. Lipson, at this time, also filed in 
the Chancery Court of the City of Richmond, a lis pendens 
against the said piece of real estate, the said lis pendens re-
ferring· to and being based on the said attachment. Your 
petitioners, the plaintiffs, filed an affidavit of substantial de-
fense, whereupon the defendant E. J. Lipson, as principal, 
with Cheavlier Morg~, as surety, executed a bond in the sum 
of fourteen hundred dollars ($1,400.00) conditioned to pay 
any damage sustained by anyone by reason of the suing out 
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·of the said attachment. At the hearing of the said attacl1n1ent, 
your petitioners, C. B. !farris and Pearl }I. Harris, made a 
motion to quash the said attachment and the court, after hear-
ing the evidence, entered an order dismissing the said at-
tachment on the ground that it 'vas s~ted out w·ithout suf-
fic·ient cause. 
The plaintiffs, at the trial, offered to prove that: 
At the time of the suing out of the said attachment, your 
petitioners 'vere negotiating for the trade of the parcel of 
real estate above mentioned for another piece of property. 
The said negotiations had been consummated to the extent 
that a valid written contract had been executed by all parties 
· to close the d'~al, and your petitioners had put ,up the sum 
of two hundred fifty dollars ($250.00) as earnest money and 
had expended fifty dollars ($50.00) for examination of title . 
.At this time, the other party to the real estate transaction 
received notice of the said attachment against the real estate 
·and by reason of this fact refused to carry out and complete 
the trade which had been negotiated. 
On the trial of this case the court, holding there was a 
levy on the rents, allowed the plaintiffs to introduce evidence 
as to the tying up of the rents by reason of the attachment 
and instructed the jury that the plaintiffs could recover noth-
ing except the legal rate of interest on the sum of n1oney rep-
resenting rents held by the real estate agent for the period 
for ·which it ''ras tied up by the attachment. The court re-
fused to permit the plaintiffs to offer any evidence as to the 
real estate trade, or the filing of the lis pendens, or the loss 
resulting· from the failure of the contract of trade on the 
ground that as the sheriff had failed to make the proper en-
dorsement on his return there had been no levy of the attach-
ment on the real estate and consequently there had been no 
suing out of the attachment against the real estate. 
THE ASSIGm1:ENTS OF ERROR. 
Your petitioneys assign as error the following: 
1. The court ·erred in refusing to permit the plaintiffs to 
introduce evidence regarding the real estate trade and the lis 
pendens. 
2. The court ~rred in instructing the jury that the plain-
tiffs could recover only the legal rate of interest on the rents 
tied up. · 
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3. The court erred in refusing the instructions offered by 
the plaintiffs. 
As the first three assignments are based on the same point, 
the discussiol}. of assignn1ent nun1ber 1 takes care of all 
three. 
ASSIGN1IENT OF ERROR NO. 1. 
],IRST ARGU~:IENT. 
The Court er·red in 1·etusing to pennit the plalintijfs to in-
troduce ev·idence 1·ega/rding the real estate trade and the lis 
pendens because the prov·ision of the bond was that the ob-
ligors would pay for any damage S'ltstained by 1·eason of the· 
suing out of the attachtnent, and the attach1nent was sued out 
as to the real estate. 
The action in this case is brought on the bond. The bond 
executed by the defendant is to the effect that the obligors 
will pay all damages sustained by any person by reason of 
the suing out of the attach1nent. The plaintiffs ·alleged that 
the attachment was sued out and that they had been damaged 
by the su.ing out. The question then is what is meant by the 
suing out of an attachntent. The defendants contended there 
is no su.ing O'ltt unless there is a levy. The plaintiffs con-
tended that an attachn1ent is sued out when it has been is-
sued by the cierk and placed in the hands of the sheriff for 
service. · 
Section 6393, of the Virginia ·Code, covers the lien of the 
attachment. It reads as follows: 
''The plaintiff shall have a lien from the time of the levy-
ing of such attachment, or serving a copy thereof as afore-
said, upon the personal property of the principal defendant, 
when the same is in his possession, actual or constructive, 
and u:pon the personal property, choses in action, and other 
securities of such defendant in the hands of, or owing· by a 
co-defendant on whom it is so served; and on any real estate 
mentioned in such an cndorsen1ent bv the officer on the at-
tachment or sun1mons as is prescribed by section sixty-three 
hundred and ninety, from the sning· out of the same, hut a 
holder in due course of negotiable paper shall have priority 
over an attachment levied thereon." 
It will be seen her~ that the Statute by its very terms recog-
nizes a distinction between the levy of an attachment and the 
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suing out of an attachment, for it says as to personal prop-
erty, the lien attaches as of ti1ne of levy, but as to real prop"" 
erty, it attaches from the suing out of same. Now it is per-
fectly plain that s-uin_q o1.tt, as here used, is not intended to 
include a levy. If it had been, then the word levy would have 
been used in both cases. It is apparent that in contemplation 
of this section, the words s-tting o·ut mean a thing prior to 
the levy. 
This is undoubtedly the view taken by C. Whittle .Sams, in 
.his work on Attachments. On page 159 of that book, he has 
the following to say: 
''In the Case of Real Estate. 
''The plaintiff shall have a lien fro 'In the suing out of the 
.attach1nent on any real estate mentioned in such an endorse.;. 
n1ent by the officer on the attachment or summons as is pre-
scribed by section 2967. · 
''The form given for this endorsement by section 2967 is 
as follows: · 
"Levied on the following estate of the defendant A B (or 
AB and CD), to-wit: (:Here describe the estate), this ..... ; 
day of............. · 
''E. F. Sheriff (or other officer).'' 
''Section 2967 also provides that the attachment shall be 
served on the person, if any, in possession of the real estate. 
(See 5d, Chapter VIII). The lien of the attachment, however, 
relates back to the s~ting mtt of the attachment, and not to 
the .time of the endorsement by the sheriff, or the service on 
the person in possession. (Section 2971.) But such estate, 
in order to be affected by the attachment, 1nust be so men-
tioned by the officer. ( 4 ~Iinor's Insts. (3d Ed.), p. 577; Bar-
ton's Law Pr. (2nd Ed.), p. 978.) 
''Against the words of the statute, as it seems to the writer, 
·Mr. Daniel construed the similar se.ction of the Code of 
1860 (Chap. 151, Sec. 12), to mean: 'The time of the real 
estate being· mentioned in the endorsement on the attachment 
or subpoena,' as the beginning of the lien on real estate. · A 
contrary view is, however, taken by 1\fr. Barton and Profes-
sor Minor, above referred to. .(Daniel on Att., p. 101.) 
''So, in the case of personal pt·operty the lien begins at 
the time of actual levy; in the case of reaZ estate the lien 
begins at the time of l)u.in,q out the attaehrnent. '' 
. . 
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. vVe want to emphasize this line. "The lien of the attach-
ment, however, relates back''-.:.note those· words-" relates 
back to the suing out of the attachment, and not to the time 
of the endorsement by the sheriff or the service on the per-
son. in possession.',. All this is spoken with respect to real 
estate. It is apparent here that Sams construes the words 
suing out, to mean something prior to a levy. It is apparent 
also that he consciously had this distinction in mind, not only 
from those words, but he also says that Daniel on Attach-
ments has a different view, but that that is against the words 
of the statute. He further cites in support of his own theory, 
Barton's Law Practice (Second Edition), page 978, and also 
4 1\Hnor's Institutes (3rd Edition), page 577. Both of these 
famous law writers show clearly that they construe the words 
suing out to mean something prior to a levy; that is, a mere 
issuance of the attachment and delivery to the sheriff-cer-
tainly no more than that. Barton's Law Practice, Second 
Edition, page 978, reads as follows: 
''In respect to the date of the lien upon per~onal and real 
property, the statute makes this distinction. The lien exists 
upon the former from. the time of the levy or service of a 
Qopy of the attachment, as the case may be; but upon real 
estate the lien exists from thG time the attachment is sued 
out." · 
4 1\Enor 's Institutes, 3rd Edition, page 577, reads as fol-
lows: 
''The plaintiff has a lien from the ti1ne of levying the at-
tachment, or serving a copy, on the personal property, choses 
in action, and other securities of defendant in the hands of, 
or due from, any garnishee on whom it is served, and on any 
.real estate 'lne'n,tioned in. an endorsement by the officer on the 
attachment as prescribed by Sec. 2967, from the suin.q mtt of 
the same; bttt not unless so 1nentioned. '' 
. To cite a hypothetical case; suppose a petition is filed for 
an attachment against real estate and on the first of Septem-
ber the clerk of the court issues the attachment and on the 
same· dav delivers the attachment into the hands of the 
.sheriff. ·N o,v, suppose that the sheriff does nothin~ for a 
period of five days, then on . the fifth day of September the 
sheriff serves the said attachment on the proper persons and 
makes his return with the proper endorsement on the same 
day, that is the fifth day of September. When does the Hen 
of this attachment aris~? It must necessarily follow that 
C. B. Harris & P. M. ~arris v. E. J. Lipson & C. ¥organ. 7 
under Code section 6393, the lien of the attachment in this 
case arises on the .first day of September and not on the fifth 
day of September. This must be so since the lien of the 
attachment, according· to the statute arises as to the time of 
the suing out and not as of the . time of the levy. It is plain, 
therefore, that the words su.u~g o~tt in legislative contempla-
'ion is bound to mean the mere issue of the attachment by 
the clerk and the delivery of the same to the sheriff for serv.:. 
ice and does not carry with it the idea of a levy. 
The case of Robertson v. I! ogue, 83 Va. 124, is a case that 
sustains this view as to the meaning of the words suitng out. 
In that case the plaintiff instituted the proceedings in the 
case against the defendant in Alexander County, alleging 
that he lived in the District of Columbia. A description of 
the real estate was indorsed on a summons by the clerk, and 
the sheriff was directed to attach all the right, title, and in-
terest of the defendant therein. The sheriff made return that 
he had served the summons on . · ..... , by delivering him a 
copy, and that he resided on the premises within described. 
The defendant moved to quash the attachment, but the court 
overruled the motion, sustained the attachment, and decreed 
in May, 1885, an account of liens, and in November, 1886, de-
creed a sale of the land. · 
The sheriff's return ·did not show, as required by law, that 
the attachment was levied upon the property, as the property 
of the defendant. The court says, quoting another judge 
(first paragraph, page 126), "The return of the officer upon 
the writ must constitute the foundation of all subsequent 
proceedings against the property under the attachment. It 
is only by the return that the court is advised of the levy, and 
special judgment and execution can only be a'varded upon a 
sufficient levy, and this must be ascertained by the officer's 
return''. 
The court further savs : ''In this case no lien was ac-
quired on the real estat~ of the debtor, * * * no attachment 
was levied on the real estate,* * • The Circuit Court of Alex-
ander County w·as therefore without jurisdiction to proceed 
further against the absent debtor. The jurisdiction of that 
court in this proceeding depending solely upon the lawful 
levy of the attachment, upon the property or estate, belong-
ing to the absent del,tor, and the attachment should have been 
quashed * • * . '' 
It is perfectly obvious on reading the entire case, and con-
sidering the issues, that what is meant is that the property 
was not sufficiently attached to give the court jurisdiction of 
the property for the purpose of a sale. Indeed, beyond any 
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question, this very case is a splendid authority for the plain-
tiffs, that an attach1nent is sued out where no levy has been 
made because the court, in this very case, despite the fact 
that it says no levy was made, says on page 128, line 3: '' * * * 
An inspection of the evidenc,e shows, moreover, that the at-
tachment was sued out intpro,vidently. '' Thus, the court, in 
this very case, clearly recognizes that an attachment was 
S'ltecl out, and construes those words to mean the mere issu-
ance of the paper by the clerk, and handing it over to the 
sheriff. So much for that case. 
Another case in point is J"flo'ltrnoy & Epping v. Lyon & Com-
pany, 70 .Alaban1a 308. This action was brought by the plain-
tiffs against the defendants and their surety on an attach-
ment bond. The bond was conditioned that the said Flour-
noy & Epping ''shall prosecute said attachment with effect, 
and pay said defendants all such damages as they may sustain 
by the wrong·ful or vexatious stting out of the said attach-
ment''. The defendants ·demurred on the ground that the 
complaint failed to allege that said attachment was levied 
upon property of the plaintiffs. 
The court overruled ·the demurrer and on page 313, first 
paragTaph, stated: 
"A ·damage recoverable for the wrongful .or malicioup 
-suing out of the writ would, of course, be materially lessened, 
if there was no levy. There would not be a ·wrongful seizure 
or detention of the property of the defendants, and he would 
not be drawn into the trouble and expense of making defense. 
But, if special damages accrued to him, such as injury to his 
credit 'vhich may be a proximate consequence of the 'vrong·ful 
suing O'ltt of the writ., these would be recoverable though it 
was not levied.'' 
OTI-IER CASES. 
West v. Engel, 101 Alabama, page 509. 
This ·was an action for damages for personal injuries. The 
injury occurred ]\{arch 21, 1890, and the summons dated the 
16th of 1\farch, 1891, was not delivered to the sheriff until 
April 5, 1891. The court held the claim was barred by the 
Statute of Lhnitations. 'J.1he Statute reads as follows: ''The 
suin~ out o.f the summons is the commencement of a suit 
* * * . " The court said on page 511, first paragraph, "When 
then may the summons be said to be sued out? There seems 
to be no question as to what is meant by sttin,g ou-t of the 
summon-s. There is a unifo1·mity of decision, so far as we 
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have observed, that the .terms is construed as meaning when 
the writ leaves the hands of the clerk, or his deputy, to be 
delivered in good faith to the sheriff, to be executed". · 
And on page 512, last paragraph, the court says: ''Our 
conclusion, therefore, from our own and other adjudged cases, 
is, that a summons cannot be said to be sued out, under 
our statute, until it passes from the hands of the clerk to 
the sheriff, or other proper officer, to be executed, or sent 
by mail or otherwise, with a bona fide unequivocal intention 
to have it served." 
Kelly v. Vincent, 8 Ohio State 415-20. 
In this case the court was construing the words sued out 
in the following statute, trying to decide whether an execu-
tion was sued out or not: ''That if execution shall not be 
sued o'Urt within five years from the date of any judgment 
that now is • * * . '' The court says: ''A writ of execution 
is a written command or precept to the sheriff or minis-
terial officer, directing· him to execute the judgment of the 
court. * * * It is nevertheless the command of the court 
to the officer to .proceed and execute the judgment of the 
court. When, therefore, we recur to the meaning, nature, and 
office of a writ of execution, and regard it as it really is, 
simply a precept addressed by the court to the sheriff, it 
would seem to follow that. such a precept could hardly be 
said to be sued o·ut, or issued, without having not only ema-
nated from· the court, the party issuing the command, but 
also en1anating to the officer commanded; otherwise, the com-
mand or precept could not properly be said to have issued." 
OTHER DEFINITIONS OF "SUED OUT''. 
Words and Phrases judicially defined, Volume 7, page 6756, 
has the following: 
"A writ is not considered legally S?ted out until it is de: 
livered to the sheriff, with authority to him to serve it on the 
defendant. Maddox v. H1tmpheries, 30 Texas, page 494." · 
''Suing· out process in equity is the same in meaning as 
suing out process at law. It means upon the .filing of a bill 
a subpoena is filled out bv the clerk and delivered for serv-
ice. In order that the writ may be deemed to be sued out, 
it must have left the possession of the officer who issued it, 
and must either have reached the possession of the officer who 
is to serve it, or someone who has the remedial of trans-
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mission to such officer. U. 8. v . .. tl1nerican Lumber Co., 85 
Fed. 827. '' 
"Under Act of June, 1887, providing that the lien of a 
judg-ment may be reviewed by the suing out, or issuing of ·a 
writ of scire facias is not ·sued out or issued 'vhen pursuant 
to a praecipe, the writ is prepared by the prothonotary, 
marked 'filed', indexed, and docketed, but not delivered to 
the sheriff for service, for as the word iss'ued means to send 
out, such writ is not issued OL' snecl out until it passes into 
the hands of the sheriff for service. In re: Johns Estate 
98-.A, 719." 
SEOOND .ARGU~iENT. 
The Court erred in rej1"sin,g to permit the plaintiffs to in-
trod'uce evidence rega'rding the ·real estate trade and the lis 
pendens, because undm· the facts of this case the defendants 
should be estopped from setting up the defense that there was 
no levy on the real estate in confonnity with Section 6390 of 
the Virgi·nia· Code. 
What is the purpose of requiring the plaintiffs to give an 
attachment bond~ The answer is, that an attachment is a 
harsh and sun1mary proceeding, and the bond is required 
in order to protect the defendant, and to indemnify him 
against loss or dmnage, that may result by reason of the 
plaintiffs' resort to attachment proceedings. In the present 
case the petition for the attachment 'vas filed, the attach-
ment was issued bv the clerk of the court and this attaclnnent' 
specifically mentions the real estate in question; the attach-
ment was delivered to the sheriff for service; the sheriff 
actually served the attachment on the proper persons; and 
the sheriff made his return, putting his endorsement on the 
paper, but in his endorsement he failed to give all the details 
required by statute. This 'vas absolutely the only thing lack-
ing to make a complete, perfect levy on the real estate in 
strict conformity to the requirements of Section 6390 of the 
' Code of Virginia. In addition to this, the defendant 'vent 
farther and filed the usual lis 1Jen.de'JM in the Chance1~y Court 
of the City of Richmond, which lis pendens gave details of 
the attachment and the action pending in the Law and Equity 
Court, Part II, of the City. of Richmond and which was, of 
course, based on the attachment. It is perfectly obvious, 
therefore, that the defendant, Lipson, by his resort to the 
attachment proceedings accomplished his object; that is, he 
accomplished exactly as much by 'vhat was done as he 'vould 
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have accomplished if the sheriff had written a few more 
words on his return. The proper persons had been served, 
·and sub.stantially everything had been done that could be 
done. The plaintiffs suffered serious damages, as they al-
leged in their notice of motion, and as they offered to prove. 
They suffered just as much damage by what was done as 
they would have suffered if the sheriff had written the few 
more details required by law. In other words, the real estate 
was tied up for practical purposes. It is respectfully sub-
mitted that it would be highly unjust and inequitable and 
clearly A VIOLATION OF THE SPECIFIED TERM OF 
THE BOND to permit the defendants to come in and say: 
Yes, ·we filed our petition for an attachment against your real 
estate, specifically mentioning the property; the clerk issued 
the attachment; the sheriff served it on all proper parties; 
we filed a lis pendens in addition; we tied up your rent; we 
broke up your profitable real estate deal, causing· you to lose ' 
the profit, the earnest money, the real estate commission, and 
expenses of drawing papers and deeds, but you cannot sue 
us and recover damag·e on the bond because the sheriff didn't 
write enough words on his return. 
We cite at this point the case of Dnt1wmond v. Stewart, 8 
Iowa, page 341. The syllabus to this case read as follows: 
''Where an attachment de facto has been made, the defend-
ant in an action on the attachment bond, cannot set up as a 
defense, that the process ''rhich he has sued out, and set ago-
ing, was not executed in accordance with law; nor will the 
defective service of the writ of attachment render the writ 
void.'' The court says on page 344, in the second para-
graph: ''The defendant argues that the return does not 
show a legal levy-a proceeding according to statute, and 
that, therefore, it is void, and no levy. The defect assigned 
is, that it does not show that the officer gave notice to the 
defendant, nor that he gave notice to the person occupying 
the premises. Passing by the consideration that these mat-
.... ters would not render the attachment void, we remark that 
it 'vould be a strange defense for the creditor to make, that 
the process which he had sued ont, and set agoing was not 
executed in accordance with law, where an attachment de facto 
had been made.'~ 
CONCLUSION. 
For the foregoing reasons your petitioners pray that a 
writ of error may be awarded them and that the judgment of 
the Law and Equitv Court, Part II, 9f the City of Richmond, 
complained of in the foregoing petition be reviewed and set 
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aside by this Honorable Court and that this Honorable Court 
remand the case to the Law and Equity Court, Part II, of 
the City of Richmond for a new trial; and beg that a rea-
sonable opportunity n1ay be afforded them for stating orally 
the reasons for reviewing the judgment complained of. 
C. B. HARRIS, 
PEARL lVI. HARRIS. 
By R. DI~ON POWERS, 
STOVER H. BOWLES, 
Counsel. 
We, R. Dixon Powers and Stover H. ·Bowles, attorneys 
practicing in the Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia,- do 
certify that in our opinion there is sufficient matter of error 
in the record accompanying this petition to rendet it proper 
that the judgment complained of be revie·wed by the Su-
preme Court of Appeals. 
R. DIXON POWERS, 
STOVER H. BOWLES, 
Received copy of the above this 23rd day of September, 
1935. 
Rec'd Sept. 25, 1935. 
ALLENG. COLLINS. 
~f. B. WATTS, Clerk. 
· November 15, 1935. Writ of error awarded by the Court .. 
Bond $500.00. 
M.B.W. 
RECORD 
VIRGINIA: 
Pleas before the Honorable Frank T, Sutton, Jr., Judge 
of the Law and Equity Court of the City of Richmond, Part 
Two, held for the said City at the Court room thereof in the 
City Hall on the 23rd day of July, 1935. 
Be it remembered that heretofore, to-wit: In the Clerk's 
Office of the Law and Equity Court of the City of Richmond, 
Part Two, on the 24th day of January, 1935, came C. B. Har-
. ris and Pearl M. Harris, by Counsel, and filed their Notice 
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of Motion for J udgmcnt against E. J. Lipson and Chevalier 
Morgan, 'vhich Notice of Motion for Judgment is in the words 
and fig·ures following·, to-wit: · 
Virginia: 
In the La'v and Equity Court of the City of Richmond, Part 
Two. 
C. B. Harris and Pearl M. Harris, Plaintiffs, 
v. 
E. J. Lipson and Chevalier Morgan, Defendants. 
NOTICE OF MOTION FOR JUDGMENT. 
To E. J·. Lipson and Chevalier Morgan: 
TAI{E NOTICE, that on February 11th, 1935, at 10 :00 
o'clock, A. lVI., or as soon thereafter as counsel may be heard, 
we shall n1ove the Law and Equity Court of the City of Rich-
mond, Part Two, for a judgment against you and each of you 
for the sum of $1,400.00, for the following reasons: 
That on the 28th day of ~-larch, 1932, you, E. J. Lipson, filed 
your petition in the Law and Equity Court of the City of 
Richmond, Part 'fwo, praying for an attachment against the 
real and personal property, and money belonging to 
page 2 ~ us, and in said petition, which was sworn to by you, 
you alleged that ''we had assigned or disposed of or 
were about to assign or dispose of our estate or some part 
thereof with intent to hinder, delay and defraud ·our credi-
tors". As a result of your filing such petition and suing out 
such attachment, as aforesaid, you caused an attachment tQ 
be issued against us, by which attachment our property, both 
real and personal, and money, was wrongfully attached. On 
the 11th day of June, 1932, by counsel, we moved the Law and 
Equity Court of the City of Richmond, Part. Two, to quash 
the said attachment, on the grounds that the said attachment 
was sued out on false suggestion, and without sufficient cause. 
Whereupon, the court sustained said motion and quashed the 
said attachment on the ground that it 'vas sued out without 
sufficient cause. 
By reason of the suing out of this wrongful attachment, we 
were deprived of the free· use and enjoyment of our said prop-
erty and money, as a result of which we were rendered unable 
to complete and carry out certain co.ntracts which we had en-
tered into for the sale and trade of certain of our real estate, 
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which resulted in great loss and damage to us, and also cer~ 
tain rent money justly due and owing to us was attached, and 
"\Ve were restrained fr01n collecting sa1ne, and applying it on 
the payment of certain notes on which we "\Vere endorsers, re-
sulting in a judgment being against us on said not in a large 
sum, which we were compelled to pay off and discharge at 
an unncessary cost, expense, and damage to us ; all of which 
damage was sustained by reason of the wrong·ful suing out of 
said attachment. 
Further, on Apri115, 19:32, yon, the said E. J. Lipson, and 
you, the said Cl1evalier ~forgan, did by your 'vriting obliga-
tory, dated on the day, month, and year last aforesaid, sealed 
with your seals, the original of said writing obliga-
page 3 ~ tory being filed in the Clerk's Office of the Law and 
Equity Court of the City of Richmond, Part Two, ac-
knowledged yourselves to be held and firmly bound unto us in 
the sum of $1,400.00, to be paid to us. To which said 'vriting 
obligatory a condition was, and is annexed, to the effect fol-
lowing, to-wit: 
"The condition of the above obligation is such, that where-
as, E. J. Lipson, plaintiff, in a suit instituted in the La'v and 
Equity Court of the City of Richmond, Part Two, against W. 
A. Norrell, Lucille Norrell, C. B. Harris, and Pearl ~L :Harris 
(principal defendants) and Pollard and Bagby, Incorporated, 
Trustee, and also co-defendants, has sued out of the clerk's 
office of the said court, an attachment against the estate of 
the said C. B. Harris and Pearll\L Harris (sued with W. A. 
Norrell and, Lucille Norrell) for the sum of Six llunclred and 
Eig-hty Dollars, with interest from October 1, 1928, being the 
amount claimed by the said plaintiff in the said suit. 
''Now, therefore, if the said E. J. Lipson shall pay all costs 
and damages which may be a'varded against him or sustained 
by any person by reason of his suing out the said attachment 
and shall prosecute said attachn1ent with diligence, then the 
above obligation to be void, otherwise to remain in full force.'' 
The said writing obligatory is in the following words and 
figures, to-wit: 
"l{NOW ALL ~fEN BY THESE PRESENTS, That w:e, 
E. J. Lipson and Chevalier 1\tiorgan are held and :firmly bound 
n.nto C. B. Harris and Pearl~{. Harris in the sum of Fourteen 
Hundred Dollars, to the payment whereof W·e bind· ourselves, 
our heirs, executor and administrators, jointly and severally, 
by these presents. We h~reby waive the benefits of our home-
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stead exemption as to this obligation; and also waive 
page 4 ~ any claim, right or privilege to discharge any lia-
bility arising under this bond in any currency, funds, 
~ounter-claims or offsets other than legal tender currency of 
the United States. Witness ·our hands and seals this 15 day 
of April, 1932. 
"THE CONDITION OF THE ABOVE OBLIGATION IS 
SUCH, That whereas E. J. Lipson; Plaintiff in a suit insti-
tuted in the Law and Equity Court of the City of Richmond, 
Part Two, against W. A. Norrell, Lucille Norrell, C. B. Harris 
and Pearl l\L Harris (principal defendants) and Pollard & 
Bagby, Incorporated, Trustee, et als., co-defendants, has sued 
out of the Clerk's Office of the said Court, an attachment 
against the estate of the said C. B. Harris and Pearl M. liar-
ris (sued with W. A. Norrell and Lucille Norrell) for the sum 
of Six I-Iundred and Eighty Dollars, with interest from Oc-
tober 1, 1928, being the amount claimed by the said plaintiff 
in the said suit. 
"NOW THEREFORE, If the said E. J. Lipson shall pay 
all costs and damage·s which may be awarded against him or 
sustained by any person of his suing out the said attachment 
and shall prosecute said attachment 'vith diligence, then the 
above obligation to be void, otherwise to remain in full force." 
''E. J. LIPSON, 
"C. 1\tiORGAN. 
(Seal)" 
(Seal)~' 
(Seal) 
page 5 ~ "In the Clerk's Office of the Court of Law and 
Equity of the City of Richmond, Part Two. 
April 15, 1932. 
"Chevalier Morgan, the surety in the above bond, this day 
made oath before me, E. 1\f. Edwards, Deputy Clerk of the 
said Court, that his estate, after t.he payment of all his debts 
and of such liabilities as he has incurred for others and ex-
pects to have to pay, is worth $1,400.00, the penalty of the 
said bond. 
"Given under my hand this 15t~ day of April, 1932." 
''E. 1\tf. EDWARDS, 
Deputy Clerk.'' 
No part of the said damage sustained by us as a result of 
the suing out of this wrongful attachment has been paid, and 
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so the condition of the said writing obligatory has been 
broken, and by reason of the said breach, the said writing 
obligatory became and was forfeited; whereby, we have the 
·right to demand of you the sum of $1,400.00. 
Yet you, E. J. Lipson, and Chevalier Morgan, although re-
quested, have not paid to us the said sum or any part thereof, 
bu't have wholly failed and still do fail to do so, to our dam-
ag·e in the sum of $1,400.00. And, therefore, we institute 
this notice of motion for judgment. 
R. DIXON POWERS, p. q. 
STOVER H. BOWLES, p. q. 
C. B. HARRIS, 
PEARL M. HARRIS, 
By Cqunsel. 
page 6 ~ And at another day, to-wit: At a Law and Equity 
Court of the City of Richmond, Part Two, held the 
11th day of February, 1935. . 
This day came the plaintiffs, by counsel, and on their mo-
tion it is ordered that this case be docketed and continued. 
And at another day, to-wit: At a Law and Equity Court 
of the City of Ri~hmond, Part Two, held the 11th day of Feb-
ruary,-1935. 
This day came the plaintiffs and defendants, by COUnRel, 
and on the motion of the plaintiffs, by couns·el, it is ordered 
that the defendants do file herein a statement of the grounds 
of their defense to this action within ten days from this date. 
And at another day, to-wit: At a Law and Equity Court 
of the City of Richmond, Part Two, held the 17th day of 
June, 1935. 
This day came the defendants, by counsel, and filed herein 
a statement in writing of the grounds of their defense to this 
action, their demurrer in writing to the plaintiffs' Notice of 
Motion for Judgment, together with the grounds thereof, 
and their two pleas in writing certified by affidavit. 
page 7 ~ Virginia : 
.In the Law and Equity Court of the City of Richmond, Part 
Two. 
C. B. Harris and Pearl M. Harris 
v. 
E. J. Lipson and Chevalier 1\{organ. 
I 
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GROUNDS OF DEFENSE. 
1. Special plea #1 conditions of the bond performed. 
2. That the property of plaintiffs, real and personal, and 
money of plaintiffs were not attached. 
3. That said attachment was not sued out on false sugges-
tion and without sufficient cause. 
4. That by reason of the suing out of said attachment 
plaintiffs were not deprived of the free use· and enjoyment 
of their property. that the attachment did not restrain plain-
tiffs from collecting their rent and did not result in judg-
ment against plaintiffs for a security debt and did not cause 
them damage. 
5. That the claim of defendant, E. J. Lipson, against the 
plaintiffs, C. B. Harris and Pearl M. Harris, asserted in said 
attachment referred to was a just claim and that the court 
entered a judgment in favor of said E. J. Lipson against 
said C. B. Harris and Pearl M. Harris for the amount of said 
claim with principal interest and costs. 
6. That the plaintiffs have another suit pending in the 
Circuit Court of the City of Richmond, Virginia, against this 
defendant E. J. Lipson alleging that they were damaged by 
reason of the suing out of the identical attachment in this 
action mentioned and claiming damages and they should be 
required to dismiss this action. 
. 7. That said attachment was not levied upon any 
page 8 ~ property of the plaintiffs in this action and no prop-
erty was seized or sold under said attachment and 
no damage was sustained by plaintiffs for which these de-
fendants are liable. 
. ........................... ' p. d . 
. Virginia: 
In the Law and Equity Court of the City of Richmond, Part 
Two. 
C. B. Harries 3;nd Peal'! M. Harris 
v. 
E. J. Lipson. 
DEMURRER AND GROUNDS. 
The defendants demur to the notice of motion for judg-
ment filed by the plaintiffs in this action, and for cause of de-
murrer, say that said notice of motion for judgment is not 
sufficient in law. 
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GROUNDS OF DEMURRER. 
The defendants crave oyer of the following papers: 
(A) The attachment which the plaintiffs alleged was caused 
to be issued against the plaintiffs in this action in this court 
March 28, 1932, tog·ether with the return entered on the said 
attachment by the sheriff. 
(B) The final order of judgment entered in that attachment 
action; which being produced; 
Defendants say that said notice of motion does not allege 
(1) that any property was seized under or by virtue of said 
attachment or (2) that any property was sold. 
An exan1ination of said attachn1ent does not show 
page 9 ~ that same was levied upon any property whatever 
according to the requirements of la,v, in such case 
made and provided and· especially according to Section 6390 
Code of Virg·inia 1930, and does not show that any property 
was sold under or by virtue thereof. 
That defendant E. J. Lipson had a right under law to cause' 
to be issued said attachment; that he acted in good faith, be-
lieving that he had a right to cause said attachment to be 
issued; that said attachment was not levied upon any prop-
erty and there was no sale under or by virtue of said at-
tachment; that there 'vas no damage; therefore there was no 
trespass by and no liability on this defendant E. J. Lipson 
for innocently doing that which he honestly believed he had 
a right to do, and therefore there 'vas no liability under said 
bond given by these defendants. 
That the judgment of the court in that attachment action 
was that plaintiff E. J. Lipson, who is now defendant in the 
action, should recover the amount sued for. · 
That the notice of motion for judgment does not aver that 
defendant E. J. Lipson acted with either malice or the want 
of proper cause, 'vhile it should aver both malice and the want 
of proper cause either expressively or by equipollent expres-
sions and without so changing it is dern~trrerable. 
Virginia: 
In the Law and Equity Court of the City of Richmond, Part 2. 
C. B. Harris and Pearl M. Harris 
'V. 
E. J. Lipson and Chevalier 1\.forgan. 
PLEA. 
page 10 ~ "And the said defendants, by their attorneys, 
come and say that th.e plaintiff ought not to have 
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or maintain the above action again them, because they say 
that the said E. J. Lipson and Chevalier Morgan did, from 
time to time, and at all times, after the making of the said 
writing· obligatory in the declaration mentioned, and the said 
condition thereof, well and truly observe, perform, fulfill and 
keep all and singular the articles, clauses, payments, condi-
tions and agreements in the said condition of the said writing 
obligatory mentioned, in all things therein contained. on their 
part to be observed, performed, fulfilled and kept according 
to the terms, effect, true intent and meaning of the said con-
dition of the said writing obligatory. 
''And this the said defendants certify. Wherefore they 
pray judgment if the said plaintiffs ought to have. or main-
tain their action aforesaid against them.'' 
E. J. LIPSON. (Seal) 
State of Virginia, 
City of Richmond, to-wit: 
I, Herman Gross, a Notary Public for the city aforesaid, 
in the State of Virginia, do certify that E. J. Lipson per-
sonally appeared before me in my city aforesaid and made 
oath that the statements contained in the foregoing writing 
are true to the best of his knowledge, information and be-
lief. 
Given under my hand this 15th day of June, 1935. 
page 11 } Virginia : 
I-IERJ\IIA.N GROSS, 
Notary Public. 
In the Law and Equity Court of the City of Richmond, Part 
Two. 
C. B. Harris and Pearl M. Harris 
v. 
E. J. Lipson and Chevalier Morgan. 
And the said defendants by their attorneys come and say 
that the plaintiffs ought not to have or maintain their actions 
aforesaid against them, because they say that the said plain-
tiffs instituted a suit against this defendant E. J. Lipson in 
the Circuit Court of the City of Richmond, Virginia, before 
the institution of this suit and in which they alleged that they 
'vere damaged by reason of the suing out of the identical 
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attachment in this action mentioned and claiming damages 
for the same cause of action as relied upon herein, and that 
the said suit is now pending in said court. 
And this ~hey are ready to verify. Wherefore, they pay 
judgment if the said plaintiffs out to have or maintain their 
action aforesaid thereof against them. 
E. J. LIPSON. (Seal) 
State of Virginia, 
City of Ri~hnwnd, to-wit: 
I, Herman Gross, a notary public for the city aforesaid 
in the State of Virginia do certify that E. J. Lipson per-
sonally appeared before me in my city aforesaid and made 
oath that the statetnent contained in the foregoing writing 
are true to the best of his knowledge, information and be-
lief. · 
Given under my hand this 15th day of June, 1935. 
IIER.~1AN GROSS, 
Notary Public. 
page 12 ~ . And at another day, to-wit: At a Law and Equity 
·court of the City of Richmond, Part Two, held 
the 2oth day of June, 1935. 
This day came again the plaintiffs and defendants, by 
counsel, and the Court requiring· the plaintiffs to elect whether 
they will proceed in tort or on the bond sued on herein, the 
plaintiffs thereupon elected to proceed on the said bond. The 
defendants then moved the ·Court to require the plaintiffs to 
strike out ft'om their Notice of Motion for Judgment all al-
legations as to their actipn in tort, which motion the Court 
overruled; and to which action of the Court the defendants, 
by counsel, excepted. · 
·The plaintiffs then joined in the demurrer heretofore filed 
by the defendants in this action, and the defendants there-
upon craved oyer of the record in the attachment suit here-
tofore instituted in this court under the style of E. J. Lipson 
v. C. B. Harris, et als., and said record being read into the 
record, and the said demurrer of the defendants being argued, 
the Court is of opinion that the plaintiffs' said Notice of 
Motion for Judgment is sufficient in law for the plaintiffs 
to have and maintain their ~nit against the defendants, doth 
overrule the said demurrer to the said Notice of ~{otion for 
,Judgment; to which action of the Court the defendants, by 
counsel, excepted. 
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The plaintiffs then replied generally to the two pleas in 
writing heretofore filed by the defendants ~nd issue being 
joined thereon came a jury, to-wit: E. H. :B,itcher, E. A. 
Stumpf, Jr., James H. Britton, Edward Waller, Jr., H. K. 
Perkins, Drewry H. Alley, and H. R. W ayt, being sworn well 
and truly to try the issue joined in this case and having heard 
the evidence and arguments of counsel 'vere sent out of court 
to consult of a verdict and after some time returned into 
court with a verdict in the words and figures fol-
page 13 ~ lowing, to-wit: ''We, the jury, on the issue joined 
find for the plaintiff & assess damages at the legal 
rate of interest on the sum of Sixty Dollars for the period 
beginning March 28/32 & ending June 11/1932.'' . 
Thereupon the plaintiffs, by counsel, moved the Court to 
set aside the verdict of the jury as contrary to the law and 
the evidence, and for other reasons set forth in writing and 
now made a part of the record, which· motion the Court over_. 
ruled; to which action of the Court the plaintiffs, by counsel, 
excepted. 
And the Court no'v entering of record that the matter in 
controversy herein was of greater value than twenty dollars, 
exclusive of interest, it is considered by the Court that the 
plaintiffs recover against the defendants the sum of Seventy-
five cents with interest thereon to be computed after the rate 
of six per centum per annum from the 20th day of June, 1935, 
until paid, but that the said plaintiffs and said defendants 
shall each pay their costs i~ this action; to which action of 
the Court the plaintiffs, by counsel, excepted. 
:n,remorandun1: Upon the trial of this case the plaintiffs, 
hy counsel, excepted to sundry opinions of the Court given 
against them and on their motion leave is hereby given them 
to :file bills of exceptions or certificates of exception herein 
at any time 'vithin sixty days from this date as prescribed 
by law. 
page 14} Virginia: 
In the Law and Equity Court, Part II, of the City of 
Richmond. 
C. B. Harris and Pearl M. Harris, Plaintiffs, 
v. 
E. J. Lipson and Chevalier Morgan, Defendants. 
The plaintiffs move the court to set aside the verdict of the 
jury for the following· reasons: 
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FIRST, the verdict is contrary to the law and evidence. 
· SECOND, the refusal of the court to grant the instruction 
offered by the plaintiffs, to which ruling the plaintiffs, by 
counsel, excepted. -
THIRD, overruling the plaintiffs' objection to the inst.ruc-
tion given by the court, to 'which ruling the plaintiffs ex-
cepted. 
FOURTH, refusal of the court to permit the plaintiffs to 
introduce evidence as to damages sistained by them in con-
nection with a real estate transaction, to which ruling the 
plain tiffs excepted. 
R. DIXON POWERS, 
Attorneys for Phiintiffs. 
·page 15 ~ And now at this day, to-wit: At a Law and 
Eq'uity Court of the City of Richmond, Part Two, 
held the 23rd day of July, 1935. 
This day came again the plaintiffs and defendants, by 
counsel, and thereupon the plaip.tiffs tendered to the Court 
its three certificates of exceptions, the first being a certifi-
cate of tl1e evidence, and on the request of the plaintiffs the 
said three certificates are signed and made parts of the record 
in this case. 
page 16 ~ Virginia : 
In the Law and Equity Court, Part II, of the City of 
Richmond. 
C. B. Harris & Pearl ~L Harris, Plaintiffs, 
' v. 
E. J. Lipson and Chevalier ~{organ, Defendants. 
CERTIFICATES OF EXCEPTIONS. 
CERTIFICATE NO. 1. 
The following evidence on behalf of the plaintiff, as here-
inafter denoted, is substantially the evidence and all the evi-
. dence which was introduced at the trial of this action: 
Plaintiffs introduced the original petition for attachment: 
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Virginia: 
In the Law and Equity Court of the City of Richmond, 
Part II. 
E. -J. Lipson, Plaintiff, 
v. 
W. A. Norrell, Lucille Norrell~ C. B. IIarris and Pearl M. 
Harris, Principal Defendants, and Pollard & Bagby, Inc., 
Trustee, and E. Lorraine Ruffin and John Sloan, Trus-
tees, Co-Defendants. 
PETITION FOR ATTACHMENT. 
To the Honorable ·Frank T. Sutton, Jr., Judge : 
Your petitioner, E. J. Lipson, respectfully shows unto your 
Honor that the said W. A. Norrell, Lucille Norrell, 
page 17 ~ C. B. Harris and Pearl M. Harris, the above-
named principal defendants, are indebted to him 
in the sum of $782.00, with interest on $680.00 thereof from 
·October 1st, 1928, until paid, at the rate of 6% per annum, 
which said sum of n1oney, with interest as aforesaid, your 
petitioner, the plaintiff herein, is at least entitled to and 
ought to recover from the said W. A. Norrell, Lucille Nor-
rell, C. B. Harris and Pearl'~I. Harris, by virtue of the fol-
lowing facts : 
That the plaintiff is the owner of and holder in due course, 
for value, of 34 certain negotiable homestead waiver notes, 
all dated October 1st, 1928, made by the said ,V. A. Norrell, 
Lucille Norrell, and endorsed by the said C. B. Harris and 
Pearl }f. Harris each note being for the principal sum of 
$20.00 with interest thereon from October 1st, 1928, payable . 
to bearer, one note each month from 42 through 75 months 
after date. The makers and endorsers of said notes waive the 
benefit of their homestead exemption as to said debt and 
agree to .pay all expenses incurred in collecting the same, in-
cluding 15% attorneys' fees in case said notes are not paid 
at maturity. The said notes are secured by a deed of trust 
given on certain real estate in the city of Richmond, Vir-
ginia, known and designated as No. 1128 Randolph Street, 
from the said W. A. Norrell_to R. M. Wingfield, trustee, dated 
September 4th, 1928, and recorded in the clerk's office of 
Richmond Chancery Court, in Deed Book 359 A, page 65, 
which deed of trust provides that all the notes shall, at the 
option of the beneficiary, become forthwith due and payable 
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in the event of default in the ,payment of any part of the 
debt secured, or in the event of the breach of any of the cove_-
nants entered into or imposed under the said deed of trust, 
and there was a default in the payment of a charge upon the 
said real estate, in that a prior lien or debt due 
page 18 ~ on the said real estate No. 1128 Randolph Street 
secured by prior deed of trust amounting to $1,000 
with interest become due on January 15th, 1932, and no pay-
ment was made thereof or any part thereof, and your peti-
tioner having exercised a leg·al rig·ht and option to declare 
all of the said debt due bv reason of the said default. 
Your petitioner further ·shows that the said Pearl M. I-Iar-
ris is the owner of a parcel of real estate located at No. 1601 
I dlwood Avenue, Richmond, 'Tirginia, upon which there is a 
deed of trust given from her to the said ·Pollard & Bagby, 
Inc., Trustee, securing an amount now due which is unknown 
to your petitioner. 
Your petitioner further shows that the said C. B. Harris 
is the owner of a piece of property lying and being in the 
city of Richmond, Virginia, known as Nos. 101112 and 103 S. 
Harrison Street, upon which there is a deed of trust given 
to the said E. Lorraine ·Ruffin and John Sloan, trustees, se-
curing the principal sum of $1,000 with interest. 
Your petitioner further show·s and charges that the said 
C. B. Harris and Pearl Harris are converting, or are about 
to convert, or have converted their property above, or some 
part thereof, into money, securities, or evidences of debt, with 
intent to hinder, delay or defrsud his creditors; or 
Your petitioner further shows and charges that the said 
C. B. Harris and Pearl J\L Harris have assigned or disposed 
of, or are about to assign or dispose of their estate, or some 
part thereof, with intent to hinder, delay or defraud their 
creditors. 
Wherefore, your petitioner prays for an attachment agains~ 
the said real estate owned by the said C. B. liarris and Pearl 
1\L Harris as above mentioned, and further prays that the 
said W. A. Norrell, Lucille Norrell, C. B. Harris 
page 19 ~ and Pearl M. Harris be made parties defendant 
to this petition for an attachment, and that they 
shall be known as principal defendants, and they are hereby 
n1ade defendants to this petition as such principal defend-
ants. 
Your petitioner further prays that the said Pollard & Bag-
by, Inc., trustee and E. Lorraine Ruffin and John Sloan, trus-
tees, be made parties defendant to this suit, and that they 
be known as co-defendants, and that they be required to dis-
t • 
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close the amount due respectively on the respective deeds of 
trust Qn the said parcels of real estate owned by the said 
C. B. Harris and Pearl :WI. Harris, respectively. 
Your petitioner further prays that the said parcels of real 
estate respectively owned by the said C. B. Harris and Pearl 
}.II. Harris be attached, and that so much of the said prop-
erty as may be necessary to satisfy the claim due your peti-
tioner be sold, and the proceeds applied in satisfaction there-
of; that a receiver be appointed to take charge of the rents 
to be received from said real estate, that all proper judg-
ments, orders and accountings may be taken, that the debt 
so due to petitioner may be duly paid to him in these pro-
ceedings; and that he may have such other and further and 
general relief in the premises as the nature of his case may 
require. 
.A.RON GROSS, p. q. 
E. J. LIPSON, Petitioner . 
State of Virginia, 
City of Richmond, to-wit: 
I, E. J. Lipson, the plaintiff in the annexed and foregoing 
petition of E. ,J. Lipson, dated March 28th, 1932, 
page 20 } for an attachment as therein set forth, being cog-
nizant of the facts therein stated, do hereby make 
oath that the statements contained in the said petition are 
true and correct to the best of my knowledge and belief. 
E. J. LIPSON. 
Sworn to and subscribed by the said E. J. Lipson, before 
n1e, in my city aforesaid, in the State of Virginia, as above 
set forth, this 28th day of ~{arch, 1932. 
R.ALEIGH PHILLIPS, 
Notary Public for the City of Richmond. 
The Plaintiffs introduced the original attachment and re-
turn: · 
TIIE COl\i~ION,VEALTI-I OF VIRGINIA, 
To the Sheriff of the City of Richmond-Greeting: 
E. ,J. Lipson having filed in the Clerk's Office of our Law 
and Equity Court of the City of Richmond, Part Two, aPe-
tition for an attachment against W . ..._~. Norrell, Lucille Nor-
rell, C. B. Harris and Pearl M. Harris (principal defend-
ants) and Pollard & Bagby, Inc., Trustee, and E. Lorraine 
Ruffin and John Sloan, Trustees, to recover of the principal 
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defendants, W . .A. Norrell, Lucille Norrell, C. B. Harris and 
Pearl M. Harris, the sum of Seven hundred and eighty-two 
dollars, with interest on $680.00 thereof from October 1st, 
1928, until paid, and the said Petition alleging that the claim 
of the Petitioner is believed to be just, and that the Peti-
tioner is entitled to or ought to recover, at the least, the sum 
of $782.00, with interest on $680.00 thereof, from 
page 21 ~ the 1st day of October, 1928, 'til paid, and that the 
· defendants C. B. Harris and Pearl M. Harris are 
converting·, or are about to convert, or have converted their 
property of whatever kind, or some part thereof, into money, 
securities, or evidences of debt, with intent to hinder, delay 
or. defraud his creditors, and have assigned or disposed of, 
or are about to assign or dispose of their estate, or some 
part thereof, with intent to hinder, delay or defraud their 
creditors. 
Th,erefore we com1nand that you attach the property men-
tioned and sought to be attached in the said Petition, to-wit: 
real estate of Pearl ~I. Harris located at No. 1601 Idlewood 
.A venue, Richmond, Va., and real estate of C. B. Harris lo-
cated at Nos. 10llh and 103 S. 'Harrison Street, Richmond, 
Va., and so much of the. lands, tenements, goods, chattels, 
money and effects of the said C. B. Harris and Pearl M. 
Harris not exempt from execution as will be sufficient to 
satisfy the plaintiff's demand in this attachment, and sum-
mon the said principal defendants W. A. Norrell, Lucille Nor-
rell, C. B. Harris and Pearl ~L Harris, if they or any of 
them be found within your bailiwick or any County or City 
wherein you may have seized property under and by virtue 
of this writ to appear before our said Law and Equity Court 
of the City of Richmond, Part Two, at the Courthouse there-
of, on the 8th day of April, 1932, and answer said Petition 
or state the grounds of their defense thereto. We further 
command you to summon the said Pollard & Bagby, Inc., 
Trustee, E. Lorraine Ruffin & John Sloan, Trustees, co-de-
fendants, to appear before our said Law and Equity Court of 
the City of Richmond, Part Two', at tne Courthouse on the 
said 8th day of April, 1932,. in person and submit to an ex-
amination on oath touching their indebtedness to the said 
principal defendant and the personal property of the said de-
fendants in their possession, or with the consent of 
pag·e 22 ~ the Court, first obtained, file an answer in writing, 
under oath, stating whether or not they are so in-
debted, and, if so, the amount thereof and the time of ma-
turity or whether they have in their possession any personal 
property belonging to the said principal defendants, and, if 
so, the nature and value thereof. · 
C. B. Harris & P.M. Harris v. ·E. J .. Lipson & C. Morgan. 27 
And that you make return thereof on the said 8th day of 
April, 1932, and have then there this writ. Witness, Luther 
Libby, Clerk of our said Court, the 28 day of Mar., 1932, and 
in the 156th year of the Commonwealth. 
LUTHER LIBBY, Clerk. 
By E. ~I. ED"\V ARDS, D. C. 
ARON GROSS, p. q. 
(OFFICERS RE·TURN) 
Executed in the City of Richmond, V a., 3-29~32 by deliv-
ering a copy of 'vithin attachment to E. Lorraine Ruffin, Trus-
tee & another copy to John Sloan, Trustee, each in person & 
another copy to J no. Bagby, Vice-Pres. of Pollard & Bagby, 
Inc., Tru:3tee, place of business of said Bagby being in said 
City of Richmond. 
J. HERBERT MERCER, 
Sheriff of the City of Richmond, 
By S. J. WINGFIELD, 
Deputy Sheriff. 
Executed in the City of Richmond, Va., on 3-29-32, by de-
livering a copy of within attachment to W. A. Norrell & an-
other eopy to Pearl lVL Harris each in person. 
J. HERBERT MERCER, 
Sheriff of the City of Richmond, 
By J. HERBERT MERCER, Sheriff. 
Not finding Lucille Norrell at her usual place of abode, exe-
cuted in the City of Richmond, Va., 3-29-32, at her residence 
1128 Randolph St., that being· her usual place of abode by 
delivering a copy of within attachment to her bus-
page 23 ~ band, a member of her family over the age of six-
to him. 
teen years and explaning purport of same of same 
Not finding C. B. Harris at his usual place of abode, exe-
cuted in the City of Richmond, Va., 3-29-32, at his residence 
1208 1V. l\fain St., that being his usual place of abode by de-
livering a copy of "rithin attachment to his. wife, a member of 
his family over the age of sixteen years and expla'lting pur-
port of same to her. 
J. HERBERT MERCER, 
Sheriff of the City of Richmond, 
By J. HERBERT MERCER, Sheriff. 
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The Plaintiffs introduced :the bond executed by E. J. Lip-
son as principal and Chevalier Morgan as surety: 
I<NOW ALIJ ~fEN BY THESE· PRESENTS, That we, E. 
J. Lipson and Chevalier 1\tlorgan are held and firmly bound 
unto C. B. Harris and P.earl M. Harris in the sum of Four-
teen hundred dollars, to the payment whereof we bind our-
selves, our heirs, executors and administrators, jointly ~nd 
severally, by these presents. We hereby waive the benefits of 
our homestead exemption as to this oblig·ation; and also waive 
any claim, rig·ht or privilege to discharge any liability aris-
ing under this bond in any currency, funds, counter claims 
or offsets other than legal tender currency of the United 
States. Witness our hands and seals this 15th day of April, 
1932. 
TI-lE CONDITION OF THE ABOVE OBLIGATION IS 
SUCH, That ·whereas E. J. Lipson, Plaintiff in a suit insti-
tuted in the Law and Equity Court of the City of Richmond, 
Part Two, ag·ainst W. A. Norrell, Lucille Norrell, C. B. Har-
ris & Pearl 1\ti. Harris (principal defendants), and 
page 24 ~ Pollard & Bagby, Inc., Trustee, & als., co-defend-
ants, has sued out· of the Clerk's Office of the said 
Court, an attachment against the estate of the said C. B. Har-
ris and Pearl M. Harris (sued with W. A. Norrell and Lu-
cille Norrell) for the sum of Six hundred and eighty dollars, 
with interest from Oct. 1, 1928, being the amount claimed by 
the said plaintiff in the said suit. 
NOvV THEREFORE, If the said E. J. Lipson shall pay 
all costs and damages which may be awarded against him or 
sustained by any person by reason of his suing out the said 
attachment and shall prosecute said attachment with dili-
gence, then the above obligation to be void, otherwise to re-
main in full force. 
E. J. LIPSON 
0'. MORGAN 
(Seal) 
(Seal) 
In the Clerk's Offic.e of the Court of Law and Equity in 
the City of Richmond, Part Two. 
April 15, 1932. 
Chevalier Morg·an, the surety in the above bond, this day 
made oath before me, E. 1\L Edwards, Deputy Clerk of the 
said Court, that his estate, after the payment of all his debts 
and of such liabilities as he has incurred for others and ex-
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pects to have to pay, is ·worth $1,400.00 the penalty of the 
said bond. 
Given under my hand this 15th day of April, 1932. 
E. M. EDWARDS, 
Deputy Clerk. 
Mr. C. B. Harris, one of the plaintiffs, after being first 
duly sworn, testified in effect that he and his wife, Pearl l\L 
Harris, owned tt,vo parcels of real estate known as Nos. 101 
& 10llj2 South I-Iarrison Street, Richmond, Virginia, and 
that the two pieces of property were rented for the sum of 
$30 a month, and that Ruffin and Sloan were their rental 
agents; that as a result of the attachment being is-
page 25 t sued and sued out the rents were attached in the 
hands of the rental agent to the extent of $60 and 
he was prevented from· collecting rents for a period of ap-
proximately 21h months. He further testified as follows: 
EXAlVIINATION IN CHIEF.· 
Hv 1\:fr. Po"rers: . 
··Q. 1\ir. Harris: did you enter into a contract with a Mrs. 
Britt for the sale or exchange of the two pieces of prop-
erty o'vnecl by you on South Harrison Street for a piece of 
property owned by Mrs. Britt on West Main Street, Rich-
monel, Virginia? 
A. Yes. 
Q. l\{r. Harris, "ras that contract consummated or was 
the sale or trade called off bv J\IIrs. Britt as a result of this 
attachnwnt proceeding·? · 
1\fr. Collins: I object to this question because there has 
never been any le"'"Y on any real estate belong·ing to the plain-
tiff, therefore, there has been no suing out of the said at-
tachment as to the real estate. 
The court sustained the said objection and refused to per-
mit the plaintiffs to continue 'vith this line of evidence, re-
fused to permit the plaintiffs to show to the jury any loss that 
t~1ey might have sustained as a result of the contract between 
l\fr. & 1\frs. Harris and l\frs. Britt not having been consum-
lnated and also refused to permit the plaintiffs to introduce 
evidence of the filing of the lis pendens for the following rea-
sons: 
That the return on the said attachment by the sheriff of 
t~e City of Richmond did not show that he levied on any 
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real estate belonging to the plaintiff and that as the return 
does not sho'v that there was any levy of the said attach-
ment on real estate belonging to the plaintiffs, that the at-
tachment had not been sued out ag·ainst any real estate, and 
that any evidence pertaining to any real estate 
page 26 ~ transactions of the plaintiffs with 1\frs. Britt or 
anyone else 'vas not admissible by the plaintiffs to 
show that they had suffered any injury or damages 
Counsel for plaintiffs contended that the action was brought 
on the attachment bond which provided that the obligors 
'"ould pay any dan1ag~ sustained by anyone by reason of the 
suing out of the attaclnnent and that the attachment had 
been sued out. Counsel further contended that the suing out 
of the said attachn1ent was the proxhnate cause of the fail-
ure of .the contract of exchange of the real estate for that 
. piece of property owned by ~Irs. Britt; that as a result 
thereof, the plaintiff lost a large profit which he would have 
made by reason of the trade and he also lost the sum of $250 
which had been paid to bind the bargain, also :a large fee for 
the e"Aamination of title, expenses incurred in writing deeds, 
and drawing up papers, and also a large 1·eal estate commis-
sion. Counsel intended to prove those losses but were not 
permitted to do so by the court. 
Counsel for the plaintiffs ex~epts to the ruling of the nourt 
on this point. 
~1:R. BLAKEY, 
a 'vitness for the plaintiffs, after being first duly sworn, tes-
tified in effect as follows: ~~~hat he- was connected with the 
firm of Ruffin & Sloan; that at the time this attachment was· 
issued or sued out that he was informed of that fact by the 
bookkeeper, as well as a copy of the said attachment had been 
left in the office; that he had been directed not to pay to 
1\{r. Harris any money on rent which had been collected for 
J\lfr. Harris on his property on South !Iarrison Street. 
~1:RS. PEARL ~L HARRIS, 
one of th~ plaintiffs, after being first duly sworn, testified 
in effect as follows: That the rents from the property on 
South Harrison Street, owned by the plaintiffs, were at-
tached or tied up [n the hands of Ruffin & Sloan, 
page 27 ~ the rental of $15 per n1onth for each house for ap-
proximately 21;2 months. 
'rhc plaintiffs pray that this, their Certificate of Excep-
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tion Number 1, may be signed and made a part of the record; 
which is accordingly done this 23rd day of July, 1935, and 
within the time required by la'v and after due notice in 
writing to the attorneys for the defendants. 
FRANK T. SUTTON, JR., Judge. 
page 28 r Virginia: 
In the Law and Equity Court, Part II of the City of 
Richmond. 
C. B. Harris & Pearl M. Harris, Plaintiffs, 
- v. 
E. J. Lipson and Chevalier }forgan, Defendants. 
CERTIFICATE NO. 2. 
The court instructs the jury that the liability of th~ de-
fendants has been dehn·n1ined by the previous proceedings 
in this court. The court further instructs you that the plain-
tiffs can recover only the legal rate of interest on sL""\:ty 
($60.00) dollars for the period for which the rents were tied 
Up. 
The foregoing instruction was granted by the court and 
the plaintiffs excepted on the ground that the court erred in 
excluding the evidence of the real estate transaction and that 
they are entitled to recover any damag-e sustained as a result 
of the suing out of the said attachn1ent. The plaintiffs pray 
that this, their Certificate of Exception Nu1uber 2, may be 
signed and 1nade a part of the record; which is accordingly 
. done this 23rd day of July, 1935, and within the time re-
quired by law and after due notice in writing to the attor-
neys for the defendants. 
:B,R.ANK T. SUTTON, ,JR., Judge. 
page 29 ~ Virg·inia: 
In the Law and Equity Court, Part II of the City of 
Richmond. 
C. B. Harris & Pearl M. Harris, Plaintiffs, 
v. . . 
E. ~T. Lipson and Chevalier Morgan, Defendants. 
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CERTIFICATE NO. 3. 
The court instructs the jury that if they believe from the 
evidence that E. J. Lipson issued or caused to be issued an 
attachment against the estate or property of C. B. Harris 
or ·Pearl lvL Harris, and that the said attachment was quashed 
by the court on the ground that it 'vas sued out without suffi-
cient cause_; and further that by reason of the suing· out of 
the said attachment, the plaintiffs or either of them suffered ' 
damage; and that the defendants, E. J. Lipson and Cheva-
lier Morgan, executed a bond to indemnify the plaintiffs 
against any d3:mage sustained by reason of the suing out of 
the attachment, then the jury must bring· in their verdict 
for the plaintiffs against E. J. Lipson and Chevalier 1\{or-
gan, in a sum not to exceed fourteen hundred ($1,400.00) dol-
lars. 
The foregoing· instruction, requested by the plaintiffs, was 
denied and the plaintiffs excepted on the ground that they 
are entitled to recover any damage sustained as a result of 
the suing out of the said attachment. The plaintiffs pray 
that this, their Certificate of Exception Number 3, may be 
signed and made a part of the record ; which is accordingly 
done this 23rd day of July, 1935, and within the time required 
by law and after clue notice in writing to the attor-
page 30 ~ neys for the defendants. 
FRANK: T. SUTTON, JR .. , Judge. 
pag·e 31 ~ I, Luther Libby, Clerk of the La'v and Equity 
Court o·f the City of Richmond, Part Two, do 
hereby certify that the foregoing is a true transcript of the 
record in· the above entitled cause wherein C. B. Harris and . 
Pearl l\1:. I-Iarris are con1plainants and E. J. Lipson and 
Chevalier Morgan, defendants, and that the defendants had 
due notice of the intention of the complainants to apply for 
such transcript. 
Witness my hand this 19th day of September, 1935. 
J.JUTHER LIBBY, Clerk. 
],ee for R.ecord $14.65. 
A Copy-Teste: 
l\L B. WATTS, C. C. 
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